Blind Steganalysis of Mp3stego by Hernandez-Castro, Julio et al.
JOURNAL OF INFORMATION SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 26, 1787-1799 (2010) 
1787  
Blind Steganalysis of Mp3stego 
 
JULIO C. HERNANDEZ-CASTRO1, JUAN E. TAPIADOR2, 
ESTHER PALOMAR3 AND ANGEL ROMERO-GONZALEZ4 
1School of Computing 
University of Portsmouth 
Hampshire, PO1 2UP UK 
E-mail: Julio.Hernandez-Castro@port.ac.uk 
2Department of Computer Science 
University of York 
York, YO10 5DD UK 
E-mail: jet@cs.york.ac.uk 
3Department of Computer Science 
Carlos III University of Madrid 
Leganés, 28911 Spain 
E-mail: epalomar@inf.uc3m.es 
4Enusa Industrias Avanzadas 
Madrid, 28040 Spain 
E-mail: ang@enusa.es 
 
In this paper we present a steganalytic attack against mp3stego, a publicly available 
open-source steganographic tool which uses mp3 audio files as the stego medium to em-
bed hidden information. We first identify through extensive statistical experimentation 
which parameters of the medium suffer a significant deviation from normality, then we 
construct a very efficient blind steganalytic algorithm based on their use. We finally pre-
sent the results obtained with this steganalytic approach over various sets of mp3 files, 
and an algorithm for the estimation of the amount of hidden data. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Steganography means “covered writing”, a term coined in 1499 by the monk Trithe- 
mius, who devised a method to encode covert messages into prayers. 
Along the years, many different methods of secret communication to conceal the ex-
istence of hidden data were employed. Among these: writing into shaved slave heads or 
wax-covered tables, knitting, invisible inks, microdots, combinations of the dots and dashes 
on i, j, t and f giving Morse codes, null ciphers, covert channels, and spread-spectrum 
communications. 
Steganography is the art and science that studies how to hide information within 
seemingly innocuous media (e.g. images, audio files, text, html, etc.). It is important to 
note that steganography and cryptography, although related, are quite different disciplines: 
While cryptography tries to “cramble” messages so that if intercepted they cannot be un-
derstood, steganography camouflages messages to hide its existence and make them seem 
invisible, thus concealing the fact that a message is being sent altogether. An encrypted 
message may draw suspicion while an invisible message will not. 
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Steganography should provide a way of secret communication which cannot be re-
moved without significantly altering the data in which it is embedded. For the data to be 
recovered, an attacker should first find a way to detect it, only then being able to mount a 
classical cryptanalysis attack (it is common practice to cipher messages before hiding). 
The associated field which tries to detect, recover or eliminate messages hidden with 
steganographic techniques is called steganalysis. 
Steganography is nowadays in common use, both for copyright protection of digital 
media and for exchanging information without raising suspicions (of law enforcement 
agencies and/or dictatorial governments, for example) There are many tools for hiding 
messages in images, audio files, video, and other not so common media such as text [17, 
19, 20], tcp/ip packets [21], executable files [22], DNA strands [16], XML [18], etc. The 
huge amount of internet traffic allows for easy covering hidden messages in media where 
the addition of this extra information is very difficult to detect even when complex, time 
consuming steganalytic techniques are applied. 
 
1.1 The Mp3stego Tool 
 
The mp3stego tool [12] is a steganographic software that allows to insert and sub-
sequently extract hidden information into mp3 files. The tool is freely distributed to-
gether with its source code in C. It was created by Fabien A. P. Petitcolas [5, 12, 14] in 
the Computer Laboratory (Cambridge) in 2002, after observing that, among the broad 
range of available steganographic tools, there was no one to hide information into mp3 
files. Besides being mp3 an extremely popular format − it offers a perceived quality simi- 
lar to that provided by a CD with an approximate compression rate of 11/1 at 128 kbps − 
its usage as a stego medium is not as easy as with many other audio formats, mainly be-
cause the high compression rate significantly reduces the redundance needed to embed 
hidden data. 
In mp3stego, information is embedded during the compression process described in 
the mp3 specification. Before being incorporated into the file, the text to be hidden is first 
compressed and enciphered. Even though we will not elaborate on this feature, it is 
worth noting that mp3stego can be also used as a watermarking system for mp3 files. 
To date, the only known attack against the scheme used by mp3stego consists in re-
storing (evidently with losses) the audio signal, and generating the mp3 file again. This 
process deletes the hidden information, but also causes a significant loss of audio quality. 
In [15] an in-depth study of this tool and its steganographic capabilities is presented. 
 
1.2 Overview 
 
In this article we present a study that tries to find if there are statistical significant 
differences between the mp3 files generated by mp3stego, that carry hidden information, 
and the same files when no information has been inserted. So we try to determine if the 
insertion of this additional information by means of the technique employed by mp3stego 
significantly alters the cover medium. Based in the analysis of these differences, we pro-
pose a method to decide whether or not an mp3 file carries out contents hidden with 
mp3stego. Finally, we conclude that the proposed technique, apart from distinguishing 
mp3 files with steganalytic contents, is able of accurately giving an estimation of how 
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many bits were actually embedded. The aggregation of the results of these two algo-
rithms (detection plus estimation) constitutes a very powerful attack on the mp3stego 
application. 
2. PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTATION 
2.1 A Brief Note about the Mp3 Audio Format 
 
The MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3, commonly known as mp3, is a popular encoding and 
compression scheme designed to reduce the amount of data required to represent a digital 
audio signal, yet still keeping a reasonable quality with respect to the original, uncom-
pressed sound. Basically, the mp3 scheme uses two different compression techniques. 
First, a lossy filtering is applied, in which certain contents are discarded simply because 
they are not audible by the vast majority of listeners. A lossless compression is then ap-
plied to the filtered signal, which removes redundancies by using a semioptimal com-
pression through a Huffman code [1]. 
An mp3 coder uses a psychoacoustic model based on the subjective human percep-
tion of sounds. In practice, this stage is implemented by means of a bank of filters that 
extract and reorder the spectral information in a number of frequency bands. The percep-
tual model determines which frequencies can be removed and which must remain unal-
tered. After the quantization stage, the signal is codified into a bitstream of compressed 
digital audio. 
There are a huge number of sources about the details of the mp3 standard. Apart 
from the official documents, interested readers can find further information in [2, 3]. A 
more general introduction can be found in [4], while [13] provides a presentation rich in 
technical details. 
 
2.2 Test-Bed 
 
The first step in our research was to determine how relevant the differences between 
a file with and without hidden information embedded by mp3stego actually are. How-
ever, both the information to be inserted and the inherent features of the audio file can 
exert some influence in the final results. 
To yield an acceptable level of generality in our conclusions, we prepared a test-bed 
composed of 138 sound files extracted from different music CDs. Each file was first 
converted to wav format, for this is the input format required by the mp3stego tool. The 
wav (waveform audio file) format is original from Microsoft Windows 3.1 and quite 
common nowadays. In a wav file, the samples are stored one after another, without ap-
plying any kind of data compression and using a uniform quantization. A header at the 
beginning of the file contains some additional information, such as the sampling fre-
quency. 
The wav version of each file has been used to generate 11 mp3 files: 1 without any 
embedded hidden text, and the rest embedding different messages. For these, we have 
used 10 fixed text files with lengths ranging from 29 bytes (the shorter) to 5507 bytes (the 
longer). A scheme of the test-bed preparation is shown in Fig. 1. 
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Hidden file Length (bits) 
Text 01 44056 
Text 02 26080 
Text 03 14960 
Text 04 10672 
Text 05 7288 
Text 06 4040 
Text 07 2368 
Text 08 952 
Text 09 632 
Text 10 232 
Fig. 1. Test bed.  
 
For a given song, the 10 mp3 files containing embedding data have been compared 
with the mp3 file without any hidden information. Three different comparison methods 
have been employed: 
 
• Subjective hearing tests.  
• Tests based on comparisons of some signal parameters (mainly waveform and spec-
trum).  
• Tests of structural parameters of the mp3 files. 
 
The first two groups of tests did not offer any concluding result. On the contrary, 
the analysis of structural parameters of the mp3 files reveals that these variables can be 
essential to perform an steganalysis. 
 
2.3 Variational Analysis of Mp3 Parameters 
 
With the aim of performing an analysis of the structural features of the mp3 files in-
cluded in the test-bed, we have used two different tools. First, the software EncSpot Ba-
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sic 2.0 allows us to extract the data contained in an mp3 file. Moreover, the package 
Minitab 14 has been used to carry out the statistical analysis. 
We have analyzed the set of mp3 parameters of each couple of files (one with and 
another without hidden data). During our preliminary experimentation, we observed that, 
in the vast majority of the cases, there were no statistically significant differences be-
tween the values of the parameters contained in a “normal” mp3 file and those of an mp3 
file with embedded information. The two most notable exceptions are the Max. Reservoir 
and the Av. Reservoir fields. 
The function of these fields is the following: 
 
• The Max. Reservoir field contains the maximum length of the reservoir field within a 
frame of the mp3 file. The reservoir is the free space in an mp3 data frame. It could be 
used by another frame which does not have space to store its data. The length of the 
reservoir varies between 0 and 511 bytes.  
• The Av. Reservoir is the average length of the reservoir field computed over all the 
frames contained in the mp3 files. 
 
In the case of the Av. Reservoir field, the analysis has been carried out taking into 
consideration different amounts of frames of the mp3 file. In particular, we have analyzed 
segments of the mp3 files containing the first 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400, …, 
1024 frames. The reason behind this procedure is simple: the mp3stego tool codifies in 
each frame just 1 bit of the message to be hidden, in a consecutive manner, and starting at 
the first frame of the file. Therefore, when a short message is embedded in an mp3 file, 
just the first few frames are actually affected by a variation in the Av. Reservoir field. If 
we embed an 80-bit message into an mp3 file, this will be inserted in approximately the 
first 80 frames. If the file has 2000 frames, the variation of the reservoir length − com-
puted over all the frames − will not reflect any anomaly. Therefore, it is convenient to 
limit our observation to the first frames. This rule is heuristic, for not all the frames will 
have space available (i.e. a Max. Reservoir field greater than 0) to embed data. 
An additional important point to keep in mind is that, as a general rule, the length of 
the message will not coincide with the length of the embedded message, as the original 
one is both compressed and ciphered before being inserted among the frames. 
Next we provide the results obtained when measuring the value of the Av. Reservoir 
parameter in the first 50, 100, 150, 250, 500, 1000, 1500, and 2000 frames. At the end of 
the x axis we also provide the value corresponding to the average when all the frames in 
the file are considered (value All). We have analyzed in detail three messages in increas-
ing order of length, with the aim of verifying if, as the amount of embedded data in-
creases, the number of frames affected by a high value of the Av. Reservoir field also in-
creases. This phenomenon is clearly observed in all the graphs shown in Fig. 2. To get a 
general view of this effect, graph Fig. 2 (d) shows the average result when all the mes-
sages are considered. 
Next we discuss in detail four illustrative cases. 
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                  (a)                                (b) 
   
                  (c)                                (d) 
Fig. 2. Variation of the (Av. Reservoir) value with hidden texts of different sizes. 
 
2.3.1 Case study: text10 (232 bits) 
 
This first analysis corresponds to embedding the message labeled “text10”, which is 
232 bits length. In Fig. 2 (a) it is observed that the value of the Av. Reservoir field is 
clearly higher in the case of mp3 files that hide this message than in those which does not. 
In particular, the numerical difference in this parameters is around 22-26 bits during the 
first 250 frames. From that point on, the difference is gradually decreasing. As the origi-
nal message has a size of 232 bits, it is expected that it will be embedded approximately 
among the first 232 frames. Therefore, just the first 232 frames will suffer an increase in 
the Av. Reservoir parameter. Experimentally, it is observed that the number of affected 
frames is around 250. 
 
2.3.2 Case study: text09 (632 bits) 
 
The analysis concerning the message of 632 bits length (“text09”) is analogous to 
the previous one. Fig. 2 (b) reflects a behavior similar to that of Fig. 2 (a). In this case, 
however, the differences in the size of the reservoir ranges between 19 an 28 bits during 
the first 500 frames. From that point on, the difference decreases until being negligible. 
These values suggest that the original message has been compressed in, approximately, 
500 bits. 
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2.3.3 Case study: text07 (2368 bits) 
 
The results for the case of a text of length 2368 bits (“text07”) are similar to those 
commented above. In Fig. 2 (c) it is observed that difference ranges between 16 and 28 
bits during the first 1000 frames (so 1000 seems to be the size of the message after its 
compression). 
 
2.3.4 Case study: analysis with all the messages 
 
For this experiment, we have carried out the following task: Each of the 10 mes-
sages shown in Fig. 1 has been embedded into each of the 138 mp3 files, resulting a set 
of 1380 mp3 files with hidden information, and the original 138 mp3 files. Next, we 
have computed the difference between the size of the reservoir between the original mp3 
file an each of the mp3 files with embedded data, as it has been performed in previous 
experiments. Finally, we have computed the average of the difference. The result is 
shown in Fig. 2 (d). 
The difference in the size of the reservoir keeps in the range of 16-29 bits, except in 
the case when all frames are analyzed. Even in this last case, the difference is still around 
5 bits. This phenomenon is due to the fact that, since all messages have been included in 
the computation, long messages have increased the average even at a high number of 
frames. 
3. A DISTINGUISHER ALGORITHM 
Previous results allow us to formulate a general method to decide whether an mp3 
file has or not hidden embedded information. The analysis will rely on an inspection of 
the first T frames. According to our previous results, it is expected that, if an mp3 file 
contains hidden data, there will be significant differences in the average of the reservoir 
length of the first T frames, for some value of T. 
In practice, however, the most usual scenario is what is known as a blind steganaly-
sis. This implies that we have at our disposal just one mp3 file. In this situation, our ap-
proach is to obtain a “clean” copy of the mp3 file, i.e. without any hidden information, if 
this was present in the file. This second mp3 file will allow us to perform the comparisons. 
There are various methods according to which hidden information can be removed. Our 
approach consists in codifying the mp3 file into a WAV file. During this process, the 
waveform is extracted, but any other information is removed. Then, the WAV file is again 
codified as an mp3 file, serving this copy for our analysis. 
Fig. 3 sketches a distinguisher algorithm for the mp3stego tool. As exposed above, 
the parameter T indicates the number of frames to be considered in the analysis. From the 
experiments carried out, and taking into consideration the length of the messages embed-
ded, it has been experimentally found that an optimal value is T = 250. On the other hand, 
the parameter P serves as threshold for the variable VarAvR, i.e. values above P indicate 
that the mp3 file contains hidden data. Experimentally, we have determined that an opti-
mal value is a variation equal or higher to 20% (P = 0.2). 
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 Fig. 3. A distinguisher algorithm for mp3stego. 
In any case, it is important to keep in mind that values for T and P depend on fac-
tors such as the codification parameters used when generating the mp3 file or the intrin-
sic redundancy of the hidden data (i.e. compression ratio), among others. Therefore, any 
practical steganalysis following the proposed method will require a preliminary study 
such as the one briefly discussed in section 2 to set appropriate values for these parame-
ters. Once obtained, the distinguisher algorithm can be employed. 
 
3.1 Results 
 
The distinguisher algorithm which is the basis of the steganalytic technique pro-
posed in this work has been applied to a battery of mp3 files just described, hiding texts 
of different length. In Fig. 3 we can observe the variation of the Av. Reservoir value, as 
computed in step 5 of the algorithm. 
It is easy to see how its value oscillates around 0% for files with no embedded in-
formation. On the other hand, information hiding is clearly visible because in most of the 
cases the variation is above 50%. Only when all frames are considered in the analysis, 
this variation decreases to around 20%. 
The maximum value in the difference plot (65%) is reached when analyzing the first 
250 frames, so a value of T = 250 is set. We also fixed a conservative threshold of P = 
0.2, which corresponds to the minimum observed value. 
 
 
Input: f: mp3 file. 
     T: Number of frames to analyze.  
     P: Detection threshold. 
Output: Yes, if f contains hidden information.  
       No, otherwise. 
Algorithm: 
1. Compute:  
AvR1 = average of the Av. Reservoir field considering the T first frames of f.  
2. Obtain  
fw = f codified in WAV format.  
3. Obtain  
f ′ = fw codified in mp3 format, using mp3stego and the same codification parameters 
that f.  
4. Compute:  
AvR2 = average of the Av. Reservoir field considering the T first frames of f ′.  
5. Obtain the variation of AvR1 with respect to AvR2:  
VarAvR = (AvR1 − AvR2)/AvR1  
6. If (VarAvR > P) then  
f contains hidden information.  
      Else  
f does not contain hidden information. 
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3.1.1 Method validation 
 
The proposed method has been validated with the following tests. We have gener-
ated a validation set made of: 
 
• 100 mp3 files without hidden contents; and 
• 100 mp3 files, different from those above, with hidden texts.  
 
The mp3 files used for testing have been obtained from the Internet, using the eMule 
application and performing multiple pseudorandom searches for very general patterns 
such as ‘*a*’, ‘*e*’, ‘*i*’, ‘*o*’, ‘*u*’, etc. We have begun with audio files in wav for-
mat. The 200 files thus obtained have been codified in the mp3 format by using the mp3- 
stego application. In 100 of them, the hidden text was texto08.txt, of 119 bytes, which we 
consider to be the minimum needed for interchanging a significant message (that 
amounts to, approximately, two lines of text). The other 100 files were codified with no 
hidden information at all. 
In the case of the audio files with hidden information, the proposed test had a 100% 
of success, correctly identifying the presence of embedded data. When working on files 
without hidden data, the results of the test were correct in 99% of the cases, with only 
one false positive. Additionally, in the correct detections we have observed an average 
variation of the Av. Reservoir value of a 69%. In the case of files without hidden data, 
this variation is of − 14%. This reinforces the correctness of choosing this parameter as a 
base for a distinguisher algorithm. 
 
Fig. 4. Bit reservoir variation after applying the proposed method. 
3.2 Estimation of the Hidden Data’s Length 
 
As implicitly shown in some of the previous figures and analysis, the amount of 
frames affected by the variation of the reservoir bit can be used to estimate the length of 
the hidden data. 
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Empirical data 
Dropping point (DP) 175 375 375 750 1250 1750 
Estimated bits/message (EBM) 232 632 952 2368 4040 7288 
       
Regression       
Linear: EBM = − 825.5 + 4.378 * DP 
Quadratic: EBM = − 97.7 + 1.961 * DP + 0.00126 * DP2 
Cubic: EBM = − 674.3 + 4.991 * DP − 0.002575 * DP2 + 0.000001 * DP3 
 
Quadratic differences 
Linear 736542 
Quadratic 244429 
Cubic 3567685 
Fig. 5. Regression data to estimate the number of embedded bits. 
 
The experiments showed that the relation between the number of embedded bits and 
the number of frames affected is not necessarily linear, because the hidden data is com-
pressed before insertion. However, there is empirical evidence that a certain relationship 
exists between these two variables, such as more embedded data implies more affected 
frames. Intuitively, the amount of affected frames is computed by finding the dropping 
point (DP) of the difference curve (i.e. the value where the difference between the two 
curves decreases significantly). 
In our experiments (see Fig. 5), the model that better fits these two quantities is: 
 
EBM = − 97.7 + 1.961 * DP + 0.00126 * DP2    (1) 
 
where EBM is an estimation of the number of embedded bits in the message. Fig. 5 
shows how this expression adjusts the experimental data found in our work. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
After the analysis of the structural parameters of mp3 files, we have observed that 
the best characteristic for distinguishing an mp3 file with contents hidden with mp3stego 
is the average value of the reservoir bits in the first frames. In particular, files with em-
bedded data present an average value of this parameter much higher than those without 
hidden information. 
A possible reason for this is that the mp3stego tool, in order to hide the contents, 
increases the quanta size, thus using less bits for codifying every text. This forces that the 
affected frames need less space and, paradoxically even when including additional in-
formation, the size of the unused data in the final file (Reservoir bits) is bigger than in an 
mp3 without embedded contents. 
Taking advantage of this, in the present work a complete analysis method is pro-
posed that, in the light of the tests performed, has an overall success ratio of over 0.99. 
We have additionally proposed a new scheme for estimating the length of the embedded 
information. When adding these two results together, this constitutes quite a powerful 
steganalytic result over the mp3stego tool. These results the some improvements are 
needed in order to make mp3stego secure enough. 
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